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Abstract 
 
The question this paper addresses is: what is the evidence for the superiority of the 
ownership unbundled transmission models (i.e. UK or Nord Pool hybrid) over other 
models? We assess the theoretical costs and benefits of ownership unbundling and 
judge these to be generally positive, though these may be potentially offset by the 
actual reorganisation costs of the ownership unbundling process. Next, we assess the 
empirical evidence. This is in two forms – econometric evidence from samples of 
countries and case studies of reforms in particular jurisdictions. The econometric 
evidence is weak due to problems with simultaneity of reform steps and a lack of 
studies, but the case study evidence is compelling. We conclude with a discussion of 
of the issues faced by countries considering implementing ownership unbundling. We 
conclude that evidence seems to be that ownership unbundling of transmission is a 
key part of energy market reform in the most successful reform jurisdictions. 
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Executive Summary 
 
• We identify 5 models of transmission ownership: independent transmission 
system operator (e.g. UK), legally unbundled transmission system operator (e.g. 
French electricity), independent system operator (e.g. PJM), hybrid independent 
system operator/independent transmission owner (e.g. Nord Pool) and vertical 
integration (e.g. traditional European model). 
 
• We address the question: What is the evidence for the superiority of the 
ownership unbundled transmission models (i.e. UK or Nord Pool hybrid) over the 
other models?  
 
• We assess the theoretical costs and benefits of ownership unbundling and judge 
these to be generally in favour of ownership unbundling, though these may be 
potentially offset by the actual reorganisation costs of the ownership unbundling 
process. 
 
• We assess the empirical evidence. This is in two forms – econometric evidence 
from samples of countries and case studies of reforms in particular jurisdictions. 
The econometric evidence is weak due to problems with simultaneity of reform 
steps and a lack of studies, but the case study evidence is compelling. 
 
• We go on to consider alternatives to full ownership unbundling. In particular is 
either an ISO or the French model of a legally unbundled TSO sufficient? We 
conclude that both of these models have problems or lack an economic rationale. 
 
• We note that full ownership unbundling does require effective regulatory 
oversight which may not have previously existed. There may also be unintended 
consequences from forced ownership unbundling, such as increased mergers 
between electricity generators. We suggest that ownership unbundling is more 
consistent with the likely technical evolution of the sectors in the future. 
 
• We conclude by suggesting that the evidence seems to be that ownership 
unbundling of transmission is a key part of energy market reform in the most 
successful reform jurisdictions. 
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The European Policy Context 
 
There is a general concern about whether current transmission ownership arrangements 
are delivering non-discriminatory access to electricity and gas networks and whether they 
or (indeed alternative) arrangements will deliver efficient and timely investment in 
capacity. Non-discriminatory access is essential for the extension and deepening of 
competition. The role of vertically integrated incumbents has been highlighted by the 
recent EU Energy Sector Inquiry. Investment adequacy is increasingly important given 
the need to make substantial investments in transmission networks. Investment needs are 
expanding for replacement of existing assets as they come to the end of their lives, the 
need to accommodate large amounts of renewables (often in different places to existing 
capacity) and the need to strengthen links to the East as electricity markets expand in 
recent and new accession countries and imports of non-EU gas grow.  
 
                                                 
1 This paper was prepared for Ofgem, whose support and encouragement in 
acknowledged. The author wishes to thank David Halldearn, Gert Brunekreeft, Christian 
von Hirschhausen, Paul Joskow, Stephen Littlechild, David Newbery and Catherine 
Waddams for helpful conversations and suggestions on unbundling. An anonymous 
referee also made very useful comments on an earlier draft. All errors and omissions are 
the responsibility of the author. 
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There are a number of transmission ownership models in existence. Each has its 
supporters. One can identify at least five major models in operation. 
 
1. The independent transmission system operator - TSO, eg. National Grid in the 
UK. [ITSO] This is fully unbundled from the rest of the system and owns and 
operates transmission assets. This has a number of precedents in Europe and 
around the world in electricity, but is much rarer in gas. 
2. The legally unbundled TSO, e.g. RTE in France. [LTSO] This is legally 
unbundled from the rest of system and owns and operates transmission assets. 
This meets the requirements of the Directives and can involve effective separation 
transmission operation from the rest of the sector while transmission assets 
remain under the same ownership as generation/production or retail. This is an 
increasingly common model. 
3. The independent system operator - ISO - model, e.g. PJM in the US, Scottish 
electricity with in the UK. [ISO] This is the shallow SO model where the system 
operator does not own the transmission assets but is ownership unbundled from 
the rest of the system. This does exist in several electricity markets but is less 
common in gas (e.g. VENCorp in Victoria, Australia is a rare example of gas ISO 
with no transmission assets (see Energy International and GasTech, 2003)). Such 
an ISO arrangement can operate at the regional level (though Nord Pool is an 
example of regional market which does not have a common ISO). 
4. There is a hybrid model where both the ISO and the TO are ownership unbundled 
from the rest of the system. [ISO/ITO] The ISO is asset-lite, while the TO has no 
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system operation function. This is the case in electricity in Chile and Argentina, 
where it was observed in the context of rapidly expanding systems. 
5. The vertically integrated utility, e.g. traditional utilities in Europe. [VI] This is the 
model that Europe has sought to move away from in successive directives, 
however it is still in de facto operation in many European gas markets and some 
European electricity markets. 
 
The issue that this paper addresses is simply stated. As the EU considers moves both to 
regional markets and to further strengthen competitive forces by ownership unbundling 
of networks from the rest of the electricity and gas systems, what is the evidence for 
doing this? 
 
The issue is therefore whether model 1 (and therefore, possibly, model 4) is clearly better 
than models 2, 3 and 5. We focus on transmission networks only and do not seek to 
address the issue of the unbundling of distribution networks. 
 
As the paper makes clear this question though simple to formulate gives rise to a rather 
nuanced answer. 
 
Issues in looking for evidence on ownership unbundling 
 
The direct evidence on the impact of electricity and gas networks is hard to distinguish 
from the general evidence on the impact of electricity reform. The coincident timing of 
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several reform steps makes it difficult to find econometric evidence capable of directly 
testing the effect of ownership unbundling. In particular, ownership unbundling of 
transmission networks may occur at the same time as privatisation, the restructuring of 
generation or production markets, the introduction of incentive regulation etc. 
Copenhagen Economics (2005a, p.16) find that for electricity in the EU the degree of 
opening of the retail market, the presence of third party access in distribution and 
transmission, the wholesale trading system and the sophistication of congestion 
management are all correlated with unbundling of transmission. However our contention 
is that there is strong circumstantial evidence for the effectiveness of ownership 
unbundling in achieving non-discriminatory access and investment adequacy. 
 
However we should note that the context in which we are thinking about this is in 
circumstances where we are considering ex post unbundling once competition has 
already been declared. This is potentially somewhat different from the consideration of 
unbundling at the time of an initial reform. This is because there are fixed cost elements 
(not least in political time) to restructuring of assets, the establishment of regulatory 
structures and the introduction of competition. Therefore unbundling is likely to be 
cheaper when other restructurings are taking place and / or when initial ownership 
structures are cheaper to change (e.g. involve initial state ownership of an integrated 
company rather than a private one). 
 
Logically, we should also have in mind the question of what unbundling is trying to 
achieve in addition to other measures that may have taken place. There may be both 
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cheaper ways of achieving the benefits of ownership unbundling (e.g. legal unbundling) 
or unbundling may have additional advantages in forcing the pace of change (e.g. by 
creating a private company with an interest in extending competition). Thus ISOs with 
continuing integrated TO (model 3 above) might be a cheaper option than the creation of 
ITSO for already liberalised systems while ownership unbundling along the ITSO-
ISO/ITO models may facilitate the introduction of further competition in 
generation/production/supply and the imposition of more effective network regulation 
than would be the case under an ISO alone. 
 
A taxonomy of costs and benefits 
 
It is useful to list the theoretical costs and benefits of ownership unbundling under the 
ITSO and ISO/ITO models. A useful amount of thinking has been done about this in the 
Netherlands, in the context of a debate about unbundling of electricity and gas 
distribution networks from retail supply. Following Mulder and Shestalova (2005) and 
Baarsma et al. (2007) provide a useful checklist of the costs and benefits which has 
inspired Table 1 below: 
 
Table 1: Theoretical Benefits and Costs of Ownership Unbundling 
Type of benefit/cost Benefit Cost 
Effect on competition Reduces scope for 
discrimination against non-
integrated rivals. 
May facilitate further 
generation mergers as sales 
of vertically unbundled 
transmission assets provide 
financial resources for 
horizontal integration. 
Ease and Effectiveness of Improves cost (and other May increase requirement 
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regulation types of) transparency in 
network and competitive 
businesses. 
for regulatory oversight of 
transactions between 
unbundled stages of 
production. 
Facilitation of privatisation May make privatisation of 
competitive and network 
businesses easier due to 
sustainability (and hence 
reduced regulatory risk) of 
unbundled market structure. 
May delay privatisation of 
network businesses because 
these can be retained in 
public ownership while 
generation and retail assets 
are privatised. 
Security of supply May improve transmission 
company focus on security 
of supply and incentivise 
improved information 
systems. 
May create information 
problems between 
generators (electricity) 
/shippers (gas) and 
transmitters in the absence 
of investment in better 
information systems. 
Transaction costs of 
unbundling 
May reduce transaction 
costs by facilitating creation 
of more efficient price 
signals. 
May increase costs if new 
computer systems needed to 
coordinate transmission and 
other separated segments. 
 
There may be also 
significant power contract 
renegotiation costs, which if 
with foreign parties may 
involve substantial wealth 
transfers and lower national 
social welfare. 
Cost of capita l/ investment Overall cost of capital may 
decline if transmission 
business can get access to 
cheaper capital and if there 
is increased ease of 
integration of generation 
and retail. In an efficient 
capital market separation 
will lead to efficient cost of 
capital for each business. 
May increase cost of capital 
and reduce investment if 
size of firms falls, or if 
regulatory risk is increased 
due to increased (and 
inefficient) regulatory 
oversight of investment 
decisions. 
Synergy/Focus effects Management of both parts 
of company may be subject 
to clearer incentives to 
improve business. 
Loss of synergy (vertical 
economies) benefits due to 
smaller size or loss of 
experience of operation of 
other segments. 
Double marginalisation Not a problem when 
multipart-tariffs are in use. 
May be an issue if available 
two part tariffs are not fully 
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efficient. 
Foreign takeovers more 
likely 
Sale of assets may make 
efficient foreign (and 
domestic) takeover more 
likely. Undesirable 
takeovers of strategic assets 
may be covered by 
competition policy. 
Sale of assets may lead to 
‘strategic’ assets passing to 
foreigners if competition 
policy allows this. 
Reduced risk of arbitrary 
government intervention 
Unbundling likely to reduce 
government willingness 
(and need) to undertake 
further major reform for a 
period. 
Unbundling may increase 
government interference in 
the operation of the network 
companies if these are kept 
in state ownership. 
 
 
Some of the realised effects of unbundling may be perceived to be negative but actually 
be positive economically e.g. it is not clear why foreign ownership is ever a problem for 
European energy firms. The taxonomy indicates that for each factor the result might 
conceivably be positive or negative, in most cases. However in most of the individual 
lines one can come to a judgement about whether the effect is likely to be positive or 
negative (we do this in the next section).  
 
The assessment of whether the net benefits are likely to be positive comes in two parts. 
First there is the assessment of the theoretical effects based on the above taxonomy and 
then there is the assessment one can make on the basis of the evidence. 
 
Assessment of the theoretical arguments on the effects of unbundling 
 
Table 2: Assessment of balance of theoretical arguments on ownership unbundling 
 Assessment
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Effect on competition + 
Ease and Effectiveness of regulation + 
Facilitation of privatisation + 
Security of supply + 
Transaction costs of unbundling - 
Cost of capital/investment ? 
Synergy/Focus effects + 
Double marginalisation NA 
Foreign takeovers more likely YES, but 
probably 
beneficial 
Reduced risk of arbitrary government 
intervention 
YES 
 
Table 2 offers an assessment of the balance of the argument under each type of effect 
identified in Table 1. Looking at Table 1 it seems to be likely that ownership unbundling 
will improve competition, ease of regulation, facilitation of privatisation, synergy, make 
foreign takeovers more likely and reduce the risk of arbitrary government intervention. In 
each of these cases the counter-argument seems weak. For example on competition, 
Joskow and Tirole (2000) analyse the relationship between transmission rights ownership 
and market power and show that the ownership of physical transmission rights (such 
would be the case under vertical integration) increases the ability of generators to 
exercise market power through withholding transmission capacity. On cost of capital / 
investment the arguments may be more debateable but there seems little technical reason 
why focus will not lead to improvements. Thus looking at the theory one might expect 
the impact of ownership unbundling to be positive on all but two of the dimensions 
above. 
 
Experience suggests that there will be upfront costs, of reorganisation and physical 
separation of businesses (Newbery and Pollitt, 1997, and Domah and Pollitt, 2001 
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observe these for the UK electricity reforms). Though as all businesses incur these 
periodically it is clear that some reorganisation costs would have been occurred in the 
absence of specific unbundling costs. There could also be significant contract 
renegotiation costs (PWC, 2006, observes significant contract renegotiation costs when 
distribution and supply were ownership unbundled in New Zealand). Mulder and 
Shestalova (2005) found that the contract renegotiation costs in the Netherlands (e.g. 
associated with contracts for interconnection capacity) for electricity distribution 
ownership unbundling were potentially significant. Clearly these transaction costs will 
vary from country to country. In addition the true ‘economic cost’ to the country 
concerned will depend on the counter-party in the contract renegotiation. Thus a contract 
between two domestic state owned electricity companies which has to be renegotiated 
will result in a wealth transfer, the net social welfare effect (if the resource costs (e.g. 
lawyers fees) of the actual negotiation are excluded) of which is zero. 
 
However, there is also significant evidence that unbundling (at least in general) should 
raise transaction costs, even the absence of contract renegotiation costs. The old literature 
on vertical economies in the electricity industry clearly finds that there are scope 
economies in the joint operation of electricity generation and transmission (e.g. Nemoto 
and Goto, 1998). Indeed Michaels (2006) reviews 12 papers on vertical integration in 
electric power and finds that 11 show benefits to vertical integration. Of these 11, eight 
test the separability of generation from either transmission alone, or a combination of 
distribution and transmission, while the remaining three examine vertical economies 
between generation and distribution.  It also seems to be the case that analysis of US data 
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also seems to show that vertically integrated utilities have lower costs than non-integrated 
utilities (Kwoka and Pollitt, 2007, find this for distribution wires business costs).   
 
Mulder and Shestalova (2005) also pointed out that the effect vertical separation of 
distribution from supply on the cost of capital of the separated assets is uncertain in its 
effects. If the firms are now smaller then it may rise however if they are now more 
focussed and can merge with similar firms or indeed integrate with negatively correlated 
risks more easily then the cost of capital may fall. However it is difficult to believe that in 
an efficient capital market the overall effect is likely to be significant. More to the point, 
separate market interest rates for the different businesses is important for financial 
efficiency, even if it does raise the cost of capital for new generation investments (and 
hence reduce the volume of investment in generation). 
 
Foreign takeovers of domestic competitive segment firms is made more likely, but in the 
UK this has not come at the cost of higher costs of operation or reduced competition. 
Radical restructuring, as represented by ownership unbundling, is also a response to 
significant government pressure and does seem to be associated with a reduced 
willingness to further interfere in the structure of the industry (which indicates that 
governments perceive it to be effective in reducing the need for regulatory intervention). 
The EU Energy Sector Inquiry is a good example of continuing pressure on countries 
where unbundling is deemed not to have gone far enough. 
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Clearly a careful social cost benefit analysis would be needed in each country case to 
calculate a sensible estimate of the size of the costs relative to the benefits. For small 
countries where the scope for competition may be limited and managerial expertise is 
scarce the benefits of unbundling are likely to be small in relation to the costs (where 
these include larger regulatory agencies and more companies). Besant-Jones (2006), in a 
developing country context, defines small power systems as being less than 1000 MW. 
However he notes that Guatemala has a competitive wholesale power market with a 
capacity of 1875 MW. This suggests that smallness is not an issue for continental Europe, 
the UK or Ireland. 
 
It is also interesting to speculate on whether there is likely to be any difference in the 
strength of the arguments for ownership unbundling in gas and electricity, especially 
given the lack of ownership unbundling seen in gas relative to electricity. Looking at the 
list of factors it is difficult to say that the arguments for gas unbundling would be 
expected to be weaker than electricity. The positive effect on competition might even be 
greater than in electricity (given the more concentrated starting point) and the transaction 
costs of separation might less given the less complicated nature of vertical economies 
between stages of production in gas relative to electricity. 
 
A recent theoretical model by Cremer et al. (2006) suggests that legal unbundling might 
have some advantages over the ownership unbundling model, in the area of optimal 
incentives for investment precisely because of the ability of other parts of the firm to 
capture the benefits of transmission investment. This would provide some support for the 
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LTSO model. However the assumptions of this model are extreme and do not take 
account of the anti-competitive information advantages of legal unbundling for the rest of 
the integrated firm. The major problem with this model is that it cannot explain the 
alledged tendency for integrated generation and transmission companies to under-invest 
in transmission under some ISO models. Congestion costs have been very high in PJM 
and were 7.7% of total PJM billing (including generation costs and transmission service) 
in 2006 (PJM, 2007, p.9). As Cremer et al. suggest their model needs to be extended take 
more of the details of actual markets into account. 
 
A further theoretical paper by Bolle and Breitmoser (2006) also suggests that legal 
unbundling is superior to ownership unbundling for utilities in general. The authors focus 
on allocative efficiency only. They suggest that the advantage of ownership unbundling is 
that the regulator reduces prices closer to costs, but the disadvantage is the introduction 
of double marginalisation (an inefficient transfer price) between the formerly integrated 
incumbent’s separated businesses. The paper then suggests that it is very unlikely that the 
advantages of better regulation can outweigh the double marginalisation effect. However 
this paper is seriously unrealistic. First, double marginalisation assumes a one part price. 
This is not the case in network service pricing, where multipart pricing is practiced and 
marginal prices often equal marginal cost. Second, the paper assumes that regulators only 
reduce prices and fail to induce actual productive efficiency savings as a result of tighter 
price regulation. Third, the paper ignores the impact of unbundling on competition, which 
be can expected to increase when businesses are ownership unbundled (as in Joskow and 
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Tirole, 2000), further reducing costs and prices. Incorporating more realistic and 
complete modelling to address these issues would reverse their conclusions. 
 
Empirical evidence on the effects of unbundling 
 
The evidence for the impact of unbundling can be looked for in two places: firstly in 
econometric studies and secondly in case studies of actual experience. 
 
Econometric evidence – Electricity and Gas 
 
There are few econometric studies which look at unbundling specifically, for the reasons 
of the simultaneous timing of different reform elements. Some of the electricity studies 
are reviewed in the context of an assessment of general lessons in Jamasb et al. (2004). 
 
Ernst and Young (2006) published a report for the DTI that looked at case for the 
liberalisation of electricity and gas markets. There are a number of regressions in this 
report. One of them regresses industrial gas prices in a sample of countries against a 
number of variables including the existence of a separate transmission operator. This is 
highly significant and is correlated with significantly lower prices (p.140). Gas prices 
seem to be around 15% lower as a result of unbundling. The unbundling variable picks up 
the ownership unbundling in the UK and the Netherlands up to 2004 (p.34). Of course the 
direction of causality is uncertain and it may be that countries choose unbundling when 
they have access to cheaper gas anyway. 
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 A similar but more sophisticated study by Copenhagen Economics (2005b) also examines 
electricity and gas price trends in the EU using data for 1990-2003. They find that for 
electricity, higher levels of unbundling (with ownership unbundling being the highest 
form) lead to lower electricity prices (p.102). They do not find this result for gas, where 
private ownership seems to be negatively correlated with price but not unbundling 
(p.239). It may be that the privatisation effect is masking the effect of unbundling. 
 
Alesina et al. (2005) examine the effect of deregulation in a number of sectors, using 
OECD measures of product market reform. One of the sectors they look at is utilities – 
gas and electricity. One of the OECD’s measures of product market reform is a measure 
of vertical integration, with the score running from 6 – integrated monopoly – to 0 – 
ownership unbundled networks and competitive segments. They find that investment in 
the sectors examined increases as the vertical integration score decreases. 
 
Steiner (2001) uses panel data for 19 OECD countries covering 1986-1996. She tests 
whether regulation and restructuring has improved the capacity utilisation and the reserve 
margin in generation and effected prices. She finds that the separation of generation and 
transmission is not associated with lower prices but is associated with higher capacity 
utilisation rates. However this study assumes that unbundling includes accounting 
separation as well as stricter models of unbundling. 
 
Hattori and Tsutsui (2004) examines similar OECD data on the impact of unbundling of 
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transmission from generation, third party access, the existence of a wholesale market and 
the impact of privatisation. They use analysis similar to Steiner but over a longer period 
1987-1999. They find that the unbundling variable seems to raise prices. However they 
use legal (or ownership) unbundling as the measure of unbundling not accounting and 
legal unbundling or indeed ownership unbundling. The US ISO system is also counted as 
unbundled and is not distinguished from ownership unbundling. 
 
The results of these last two studies are confusing. They do however find that 
privatisation and third party access (TPA) in transmission reduce final prices. Thus if 
unbundling makes these easier to implement effectively there may be no measured effect 
from the unbundling itself. Reform measures as a whole have a negative effect on prices 
in both papers. 
 
Undertaking studies on the impact of unbundling on energy prices is complicated by the 
role played by fuel commodity prices (which may be rising through the reform period). A 
desirable effect of unbundling and the associated competitive effect is not just that prices 
are lower than would otherwise be the case (which may be difficult to model given 
differences in underlying resource cost) but that they are more responsive to changes in 
short-run costs. More rapid price adjustment to cost changes might be taken to indicate a 
more competitive market even in markets where resource costs are higher. A recent 
econometric comparison of the responsiveness of electricity prices to cost changes in the 
UK and Germany found that UK prices were better explained by short-run cost factors 
than those in Germany, and further that the responsiveness of German electricity prices to 
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costs was declining over the period 2002 to 2005 (Zachmann, 2006). Clearly a lack of 
ownership unbundling is not the only factor here, but it is suggestive of worsening 
competitive problems in the, de facto, vertically integrated German market. 
 
The lack of definitive econometric evidence on reform effects (especially for gas, where 
an updating version of the Hattori and Tsutsui (2004) on electricity seems desirable) 
clearly illustrates the need for further work on this now that we have more experience of 
reform. However the problems of co-incidence with other reform steps and difficulties in 
modelling underlying resource costs will continue to be an issue. 
 
Finally, we note one paper that looks at the determinants of the state of unbundling in EU 
countries. Van Koten and Ortmann (2007) find a positive correlation between the lower 
the level of corruption in an EU-15 country  (measured by Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index) and the strength of unbundling legislation (with ownership 
unbundling being the strongest form). They suggest that this is evidence that there are 
economic rents available to incumbent integrated utilities who will seek to defend them 
by with lobbying payments. Interestingly this effect only exists for the EU-15 and not for 
the new member states. The authors urge robust action in the face of lobbying by utilities. 
 
Case study evidence - Electricity 
 
Turning to case studies of actual experience we need to draw up a list of leading reform 
countries. This requires some implicit criteria, even if most experts could quickly name 
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the leading jurisdictions. Thus considering the extent of competition in generation and 
retail and the sophistication and effectiveness of regulation we might suggest that a list of 
the leading electricity reform countries/regions includes: New Zealand, Victoria and 
South Australia, Chile, Argentina, Nordic countries, UK, New York, Texas and PJM. We 
can then ask the question what has been the extent of unbundling in each case and what 
are the lessons. Of course we can argue whether other countries should be added to this 
list. For a good overview of each of these countries/regions see Sioshansi and 
Pfaffenberger, (2006). We briefly discuss each jurisdiction in turn, noting the unbundling 
status of its transmission system in [ ]. 
 
New Zealand – [ITSO] successful disintegration of ECNZ and introduction of 
competition. ECNZ is ownership unbundled though it and a significant part of the 
generation assets remains in public ownership. 
 
Australia – [ITSO] Victoria and South Australia have implemented ownership 
unbundling. They have both had a successful introduction of competition. In New South 
Wales where there is unbundling but continuing government ownership of transmission 
and generation residential switching rates are much lower. 
 
Chile – [ISO initially, now ISO/ITO] A successful reform with an ISO, but the failure to 
separate the transmission business of Endesa (the largest generator) from generation was 
a running sore in the reform until Endesa sold the transmission business. Now there is an 
ISO and an independent transmission company (Transelec), see Pollitt (2004). 
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 Argentina – [ISO/ITO] A successful and radical reform of transmission. Transener (the 
TO} was made an independent TO, an ISO was created (CAMMESA) and competitive 
bidding/user participation was successfully introduced for transmission expansions (see 
Littlechild and Skerk, 2004). 
 
Nordic countries – [ISOs with regional coordination] creation of Nord Pool and 
independent TOs. Highly successful model with competition but a lot of continuing 
public ownership of the assets. 
 
UK – [ITSO] Independent TSO created, highly successful reform with competition in 
generation and fall of 30% in real transmission charges (1993-2005), promoted by 
incentive regulation. The creation of an ITSO followed an earlier unsuccessful attempt to 
stimulate competition in wholesale generation while leaving incumbent generation 
integrated with transmission. 
 
New York – [ISO] ISO created. Wholesale market reform has been very successful. 
Tierney and Kahn (2007) estimate that the net annual benefits of the ISO relative to the 
previous power pool arrangements are significant 5% of system wide production and 
fixed operation and maintenance costs. 
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Texas – [ISO] ISO created. Highly successful reform with some voluntary ownership 
unbundling of transmission and distribution from generation and retail. Competition now 
proceeding along UK type lines. 
 
PJM – [ISO] ISO created and introduction of nodal pricing. TOs continue to be integrated 
into local companies however large market does exist, albeit with some local market 
power problems and concerns about the lack of incentive for new investment in 
transmission. Kwoka (2006) reports on five studies of effects of the extension of 
wholesale power markets (with ISOs). Two of these studies (Synapse Economics, 2004, 
and Energy Security Analysts, 2005) find very significant benefits for consumers in PJM 
from the extension of the wholesale market relative to a counterfactual of no 
restructuring. 
 
A number of lessons can be drawn from the above jurisdictions. 
 
1. All of them were characterised by an independent system operator, independent of 
generation. 
 
2. Where transmission has not been fully separated from generation as an ITSO or 
ISO/ITO there have generally been problems associated with this (e.g. Chile and 
PJM). 
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3. Some evidence that the more radical features of reform eg. open access to build 
new lines in Chile (Pollitt, 2004) and the system of tendering with consumer 
involvement in Argentina (Littlechild and Skerk, 2004), yielded additional 
benefits beyond those experienced even in the UK. However these were greatly 
facilitated by ownership unbundling of transmission (which was slow to emerge 
in Chile, but in place from the beginning of reforms in Argentina). 
 
In each of the above cases separation of transmission and generation primarily benefited 
the degree of competition in generation. However there were additional benefits in 
keeping the costs of transmission itself down. There was also little evidence that 
transmission investment was adversely effected by unbundling. Indeed Chile reveals the 
reverse: that the integration of generation and transmission within Endesa delayed 
transmission expansions that would have benefited rivals. Where alleged problems have 
existed (as in the US) these have been due to the unwillingness of regulators to allow new 
investments to be included in regulated rates. 
 
We could strengthen these conclusions by adding a list of countries where reform has 
failed to proceed as fast or as far as seemed possible – e.g. Germany, France, California. 
In no case of a failed (or disappointing) reform was there an ITSO in place, though the 
lack of an ITSO was clearly not the only reason for problems in these markets (eg. ‘the 
perfect storm’ in California discussed in Sweeney, 2006). 
 
Case Study Evidence – Gas 
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 The evidence from the gas sector is harder to come by because so few countries have 
implemented an ITSO or ISO/ITO model. Within Europe only the UK has any serious 
experience with ownership unbundling (see Arentsen, 2004). By the end of 2005, in 
addition to the UK, only Denmark (from 2004), Spain (from 2003), Sweden (from 2004 
for one of two companies), and Netherlands (from 2005) had ownership unbundled gas 
transmission along the ITSO model (see Gomez-Acebo and Pombo Abogados SL et al, 
2005). The UK has been a successful model with degrees of residential customer 
switching well above any other market and a competitive, non-discriminatory regime for 
shippers. 
 
In the US there are many examples of ITSOs and the general consensus is that this model 
has been successful in facilitating a move to competitive gas markets and this has been a 
major improvement on the previous system of vertically integrated utilities (Jamasb et al., 
2006). In a number of US states – e.g. Illinois - there has been the successful introduction 
of residential gas competition (Hasegawa et al., 2007). 
 
While there are few examples of ownership unbundling in practice there are many 
examples of problems with VI or the emerging LTSO model in gas. The EU Energy 
Sector Inquiry highlights many of these and comments that ‘vertical integration of 
network and supply interest [in gas] leads to conflicts of interest resulting, inter alia, in 
distorted investment incentives’ (European Commission, 2007, p.66). 
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Issues raised by ownership unbundling 
 
Is an ISO without ITSO or ITO sufficient? 
 
There is an issue about whether best practice independent regulation (in the sense of 
Green et al., 2006) with an ISO can achieve most of the advantages of ownership 
unbundling. ISOs seem to deliver in the US – at least for pro-competitive short term 
system management. However the US has large regional markets with many players and 
in such circumstances ISOs can be significant and powerful players who ensure fair play 
in the wholesale market. The PJM market is the largest interconnected system in 
advanced countries. However a question mark remains over the ability of ISOs to manage 
long term congestion costs. PJM’s congestion costs are significantly greater than the total 
cost of transmission service (PJM, 2007, p.9) and it has rather belatedly announced a 
programme of major new transmission investments to reduce its congestion costs. Thus 
managing the ISO / TO interface in the absence of an ITSO is a significant challenge. 
 
In European countries ISOs facing well capitalised and large transmission and generation 
owners may even exacerbate the problem of ensuring adequate transmission investment. 
Problems seem to be acute when transmission expansions are required and contested by 
incumbent generators (eg. Chile). ISOs therefore seem to address the issue of non-
discriminatory access but not solve the issue of investment adequacy (they may even 
create it). Clearly the unwillingness of integrated generation and transmission asset 
owning firms to propose socially beneficial investments which reduce prices by 
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facilitating competition is both a theoretical and a practical problem (in the view of the 
EU Sector Inquiry). Making transmission asset ownership separate from generation 
ownership improves incentives for market expansion and deepening. Though it creates 
the new problem of potentially excessive expansions in transmission assets if regulation 
is weak, though there is no evidence of this being a problem in Europe (not least because 
of planning restrictions on new transmission lines). 
 
Is the LTSO a viable alternative to ownership unbundling? 
 
The legally unbundled transmission system operator (LTSO) model in France has little 
track record. The advantages of an LTSO are that it can potentially acheive the 
investment adequacy benefits of an independent transmission system operator (ITSO) 
without the potential costs of separation or the possible undercapitalisation of small 
transmission operators (TOs). However the residual problem of vertical integration 
remains, which may be difficult to police in less developed EU countries. It is also not 
clear what the benefits of common ownership really are if there is effective legal 
separation. ITSOs can be large companies (through international expansion) and have 
different risk profiles to gas shippers/retailers and electricity generators/retailers. ITSOs 
are also free to merge electricity and gas networks which may be very cost efficient. It is 
also undoubtedly the case that the success of the LTSO model relies on very strong 
regulatory oversight. An example of this would be the regulation of electricity 
distribution and retail in the UK, where in 2000 Ofgem took decisive action to reallocate 
a significant share of costs from distribution to retail within legally unbundled 
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distribution and supply businesses (see Ofgem, 1999). This was in order to facilitate retail 
competition with non-incumbents by more accurately reflecting the true costs of retail 
supply within the supply costs of integrated businesses. 
 
Regulatory burden of unbundling 
 
Ownership separation under the ITSO (or ISO/ITO) model may require stronger 
regulation than under vertical integration or under an LTSO with significant government 
ownership of electricity assets. This is because there are now more information 
asymmetries than before in the industry (between the firms) and more market based 
transactions between firms. This has the potential to create perverse incentives to invest 
or operate the transmission system effectively, in the absence of skilful regulation. 
Clearly fully vertically integrated firms do not require much formal separate economic 
regulation. However they may require significant amounts of anti-trust monitoring and 
enforcement action if privately owned. 
 
Possible unintended consequences of ownership unbundling 
 
Any structural reform of an industry can bring about unintended consequences and hence 
should be approached with caution. The evidence that structural remedies in general 
bring about social welfare improvements is mixed. Crandall and Whinston (2003) 
struggle to find consumer benefits arising from structural remedies in the most celebrated 
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anti-trust cases in the US (including Standard Oil, Alcoa and AT&T). However our 
present case may be an example where the gains are more certain. 
 
The main problem of forced separation is unintended consequences. The UK beer 
industry provides a good example. Forcing breweries to limit the number of pubs they 
held lead to increased ownership concentration in both brewing and pub ownership as 
firms specialised by selling assets to one another. This had the effect of raising prices 
because of reduced competition and increased costs (Slade, 1998). Clearly care must be 
taken to ensure that any sell off of transmission assets by large integrated companies 
(following ownership unbundling) does not simply allow them to finance additional anti-
competitive mergers in generation and retail. Any major policy induced change to market 
structure may require significant vigilance on the part of anti-trust authorities as market 
forces (via mergers) seek to reconfigure the industry in the light of legal restrictions on 
ownership. However it worth noting that electricity reforms which do not include 
ownership unbundling are also subject to the possibility of (negative) unintended 
consequences. 
 
Consistency with future technological developments 
 
Finally, one needs to be aware that restructuring should be robust to the likely future 
evolution of the electricity and gas industries. With increased cross border flows, 
increased demand for renewables on the system and increased future expansion 
requirements transmission increasingly competes with generation and network 
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expansions may be more important than in the past. This suggests that creating ownership 
unbundled transmission companies may be a good thing for encouraging competition 
between generation and transmission. It may also facilitate the introduction of 
competitive tendering for new lines and a move towards user negotiations over future 
investments (as in Argentina). Competition between generation and transmission may 
have the added benefit of improved information flow as in contrast to the situation under 
vertical integration, one party (generation or transmission) will have an incentive to 
reveal accurate information that will benefit it, even if it is at the expense of the other. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Ownership unbundling of electricity and gas transmission networks is a key feature of 
jurisdictions with the most successful energy market reforms. It is therefore associated 
with competitive wholesale and retail markets and effective regulation of monopoly 
networks. While the evidence is circumstantial and case study based, it seems to be 
consistent. One might go so far as to suggest that the reason why it continues to be 
strongly resisted by incumbent companies in so many European countries is precisely 
because it is likely to be successful in facilitating more competition in these markets. 
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